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Nadine Sieveking                      
 
‘We don’t want equality; we want to be given our rights’:  
Muslim women negotiating global development 
concepts in Senegal                
 
 
Summary 
 
The article shows how global development concepts are appropriated by 
women's organisations in Senegal and how their meaning is negotiated 
with respect to local discourses and practices. It is based on a case study 
of an NGO campaign for a reform of the national family law, focussing on 
the concepts of women's rights and gender equality. The tense relation-
ship between Western dominated development discourses and the official 
politics of women’s advancement, as represented by the secular state on 
the one side, and the norms of local Muslim society on the other, reflect 
the complex dynamics of glocalisation. Focussing on the strategies of 
women's organisations on the local level, the aspect of agency is high-
lighted, questioning thereby the widespread stereotype of the ‘vulner-
ability’ of women within Muslim society. 
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n contemporary urban Senegal diverging visions of development are nego-
tiated by women’s organisations, connecting globalised concepts to local dis-
courses and practices. The article describes this process with respect to the 
concepts of women’s rights and gender equality, and their enactment in na-
tional legislation, pointing thereby to particularly contested issues in the de-
bates on development within Muslim societies. Adopting an actor-oriented 
approach the author shows how Muslim women in Senegal are appropriating 
and ‘translating’ these concepts into local discourses in order to expand their 
room for manoeuvre and negotiate women’s rights within their own cultural 
and religious context.  
The article is based on a case study in the context of a nation-wide non-
governmental organisations’ (NGOs) campaign for the reform of the national 
I 
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family law.1 The latter has been a battle since its constitution, confronting the 
positions of the secular state, women activists and religious authorities. Focus-
sing on the activities of a women’s NGO at the grassroots level, the author 
analyses the inter-relatedness of the different positions with respect to their 
embeddedness in everyday social practices. In the first two sections a short 
introduction of the general context of Muslim society and mainstream devel-
opment discourses in Senegal is given, and various forms of local women’s or-
ganisations are presented to indicate how agency can be developed in relatively 
autonomous female spaces. It is argued that these spaces are largely discon-
nected from state promoted development programmes and its politics of 
‘women’s advancement’. The next section turns to the controversial debate on 
the national family law and its central issues. How the notions of women’s 
rights and gender equality are negotiated by women on different societal levels 
is described and analysed in the last part.  
Through the networking between various actors and their differentiat-
ing strategies in the process of negotiating and localising global develop-
ment concepts the boundaries between the realm of religion, cultural tradi-
tions and state promoted modernity are constantly redefined. The case de-
scribed calls for a consideration of the ‘many different modes of practical 
glocalisation’ (Robertson 1995: 40) shaping local society in the process of 
transformation. Following Robertson’s argument, that ’glocalisation can be 
[…] used strategically’ (ibid.) the article stresses the aspect of agency, and 
the diverging logics of action played out in the negotiation of development 
at different societal levels.  
 
 
Muslim society and state promoted modernisation: 
diverging development visions 
 
The religious landscape in Senegal is far from being homogeneous. The 
dominant forms of local Islam, the Sufi brotherhoods (most important by 
numbers the Tijaniyya, Muridiyya and Qadiriyya), are internally differenti-
                                            
1  The case study was part of altogether 9 months research in Senegal in 2004 and 2005 for 
the project ‘Negotiating development: trans-local gendered spaces in Muslim societies’ 
financed by the Volkswagen Foundation, directed by Prof. Dr. Gudrun Lachenmann and 
Dr. Petra Dannecker, at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Bielefeld, and in 2006 as a 
fellow in the Lise Meitner-programme, including participant observation and interviews 
with representatives of women’s organisations on various societal levels (ranging from 
international NGOs and state institutions to village organisations and neighbourhood 
groups). 
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ated and mutually competing (Villalón 1995: 60ff.).2 This competition 
contributes to a sense of religious pluralism that is part of the Senegalese 
national identity characterised by a diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups. 
Differentiations according to religious belonging are overlapping with com-
plex social stratifications, including clan and family origin, educational and 
economic background (ibid. 56 f.). What features of identity actually domi-
nate depends on the concrete context. The ’entrenched system of trilateral 
relations between the state, the religious elite, and a well-organised religious 
society’ (Villalón 1999: 129) has so far been a guarantee for the remarkable 
political stability in Senegal, compared to other cases in the region as well as 
in the broader Muslim context. 
On the local level of urban neighbourhoods and particularly rural ar-
eas, where in spite of decentralisation state administration has hardly been 
effective, the sheikhs or marabouts (the authorities of the Sufi orders) play a 
decisive role for their individual followers. In general the relationship be-
tween a spiritual guide and his follower is hierarchical, but nevertheless 
personal and often quite intense. Many Senegalese turn to their marabout if 
they are in need of help or counselling, be it in a private affair (concerning 
family, marriage, sexual relationship or health problems) or in other profes-
sional, economic, administrative or political domains. President Abdoulaye 
Wade, who since his election in 2000, frequently visits his marabout, the 
khalif of the Murids in Touba, whenever an important political decision has 
to be made, is a well known although vividly contested example. The public 
staging of his allegiance to Muridism has been criticised by a range of civil 
society actors, particularly in the print media.  
However, following the breakdown of the peanut economy and the on-
going social and economic crisis, the long standing arrangements between 
the state and the Sufi orders are more and more put into question. This has 
opened the door for alternative development concepts and discourses 
brought forward by Islamic reform movements. Their importance has been 
growing with the declining power of the marabouts in terms of spiritual 
authority and internal conflicts among the increasingly diversified Sufi or-
ganisations. Calling for a transformation of society corresponding to Islamic 
principles, the Muslim reformers are questioning the secular constitution 
and openly confronting the state promoted project of modernisation 
(Loimeier 2000: 183). This confrontation is particularly articulated in the 
controversy concerning the Senegalese Family Code (which will be treated 
in more detail below).  
                                            
2  Although the adherents of the Tijaniyya outnumber the other brotherhoods, the litera-
ture on Senegalese Islam mainly concentrates on the particularities of the indigenous 
Murid order, its economic organisation and political role (for a recent overview see 
Loimeier 2006, Cruise O’Brien 2003). 
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At the same time, the conflict between secular and religious visions of 
development in the domain of the national family law points to the impor-
tance of gender issues for contemporary Islamic movements on a global 
scale. The significance of the ’woman question’, discussed very critically 
from secularly and liberally oriented feminist points of view (Mahmood 
2005: 189 ff.), is also reflected in the common traits of diverse Muslim organi-
sations expanding on the national and local level. Its most visible manifesta-
tion is the rapidly growing number of young Senegalese women adopting 
styles of Islamic veiling which were unusual amongst the previous genera-
tion, as expression of a new Muslim identity and habitus (Augis 2003, 
Cantone 2005).3  
The state’s reactions vis-à-vis the diverse Islamic movements are quite 
ambivalent. While Islamic political parties are still constitutionally forbidden 
in Senegal, the government tries to enhance its own legitimacy and popular-
ity by staging its alliances with religious authorities during public events 
well-covered by the national television. At the same time, the few formalised 
Islamic NGOs which exist are largely excluded from the so-called develop-
ment community (Renders 2002: 62 f.). The latter is dominated by Western 
donors, bi- and multilateral development institutions, pushing forward the 
agenda of poverty reduction.  
 
 
Female spaces, Islam and the politics of ‘women’s advancement’ 
 
Mainstream development discourse, as represented by the state and docu-
mented in the official Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (République du 
Sénégal 2002), is characterised by a special focus on women, who are seen as 
the main victims of the economic crisis and classified as one of the most 
’vulnerable’ groups particularly affected by poverty (ibid.: 35). According to 
the slogan that there is ‘no development without the women’ the Senegalese 
state has promoted ‘women’s advancement’ as an integral part of its nation-
building project and development programme. The labelling of women as a 
‘vulnerable group’, however, tends to render women’s own spaces and their 
active participation in economic and social processes invisible (Lachenmann 
2001: 85 ff.).  
The shortcomings of the politics of ‘women’s advancement’ are par-
ticularly striking in rural areas, where the state’s development programmes 
                                            
3  Research has mainly focussed on the academic milieu, although reformist trends and 
new veiling styles, which are also manifest within the Sufi organisations (Villalón 1999, 
138), are increasingly spreading out in suburban and rural environments (a similar devel-
opment can be observed in the Gambia, cf. Janson 2005). 
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concerning women have mainly focussed on constituting ‘groups for 
women’s advancement’ (groupements de promotion féminine). These groups 
are excluded from large-scale national projects and restricted to small pro-
jects in market gardening, animal rearing, cattle fattening or handicrafts.4 
Therefore women’s projects have become systematically marginalised with 
respect to the state’s own development projects (Interview Fatou Sow, 
16.04.04). Although these politics of exclusion stand in sharp contrast to 
women’s effective participation in agricultural production and the ensuring 
of food security, they are still perpetuated. As Khadija Doucouré, the direc-
tor of a women’s NGO in the domain of female entrepreneurship, pointed 
out, actors of the international development community prefer to follow 
their own agenda rather than consider the capacities and needs of the local 
female population:  
 
The problem is that there are organisations, discourses, and contents which 
are auto-paralysing. They see the woman only in terms of her vulnerabil-
ity. Finally this destroys any kind of creative spirit, it blocks the women 
[…] but it helps certain NGOs, it helps certain bilateral co-operations, it 
helps the consultants. I am a consultant myself. It helps everybody. No one 
has to question oneself, and the same thing is repeated over and over again 
(Interview Khadija Doucouré, 11.05.2004). 
 
According to Doucouré, mainstream development politics and discourses 
tend to ‘infantilise women’ and put them ‘in a situation of extraordinary 
precariousness’. In contrast to this negative image, she emphasises women’s 
agency in organisations where they ‘can act independently’.5 Female spaces 
based on gender segregation are important because in mixed organisations 
men tend to control the important posts and ‘women do not have a chance’ 
unless they build parallel structures of representation alongside those domi-
nated by men (Lachenmann 2001: 83 ff., Rosander 1998: 160). That the latter 
is rather the norm was confirmed by the president of another women’s 
NGO:  
 
Here in Senegal you will hardly find a woman who is not organised, be it 
in a traditional association, a formalised women’s group, an NGO, or an 
age group. Even within a mixed daaira [a religious association, see below] 
you will find a woman’s organisation (Interview Binta Sarr, 08.05.04). 
 
To understand in how far local women’s organisations are important not 
only on the social but also on the level of economic practices, it has to be 
                                            
4  Cf. République du Sénégal, Ministère de la Femme, de l'Enfant et de la Famille, Popula-
tion Council 1993: 14. 
5  Cf. Centre Africain de l'Entrepreneuriat Féminin (CAEF) 2001: 15. 
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considered that the vast majority of Senegalese women are actively partici-
pating in the popular or ‘informal’ economy, while only a tiny minority are 
connected to the formal sector. Women thus generally do not rely on state-
provided social security, but construct their own multi-layered social and 
economic networks to cope with insecurity. Often they are active in various 
forms of female associations, like age groups, neighbourhood or village 
associations, self-help and mutual savings groups. Most of the local organi-
sations are based on kinship, ethnicity, religious belonging, or professional 
activity. While on the one hand they are perpetuating and re-enacting exist-
ing social, economic and cultural differences, on the other hand they consti-
tute a dynamic force in actually shaping economic development and social 
change. So-called traditional organisations which have evolved in rural 
contexts are transposed into urban settings, where they become part of new 
social practices. They are often still functioning informally at the heart of 
formalised organisations, like mutual savings banks or officially registered 
women’s groups or NGOs.  
The transformational aspect of traditional forms of organisation and 
their significance in the reconfiguration of social boundaries can also be 
shown with the example of religious associations called daaira.6 With rural 
out-migration, daairas were established in the urban context as important 
meeting-centres and networks (Fall 1994: 298 ff.), satisfying the social needs 
of the migrants, helping them to build up economic relationships while at 
the same time guaranteeing strong relations with the religious authorities. 
Daairas have incorporated some modern administrative structures, such as 
the function of a ‘president’ and a ‘treasurer’. Having proven to be an effec-
tive form of social, religious, and political organisation (Fall 1994: 300, 
Villalón 1999: 34), daairas have in the meantime re-migrated to the country-
side. With the feminisation of migration and the increasing popularity of 
daairas among women, the gendered structure of the daairas has changed 
(Rosander 1998: 159 ff.). Currently most daairas are mixed, but the number of 
female dominated daairas is growing. They are embedded in everyday social 
practices and constitute systems of organisation in which social, economic 
and religious dimensions are inextricably interwoven (Mbow 1997). The 
framework of a widespread and socially accepted religious practice allows 
women to develop agency, expand their room for negotiation and redefine 
the boundaries of traditional social structures without explicitly putting 
them into question. 
The characterisation of an association as traditional thus does not mean 
that its form and structure of organisation are opposed to the transformation 
and ‘modernisation’ of society. On the contrary, they have to be considered 
                                            
6  The term daaira (daayira, dahira or daira) is derived from Arab: ‘quarter’. 
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as important elements in the process of social change. This can also be ob-
served in new ‘creative “informal” coping practices’ (Lachenmann 1998: 
9ff.). Following Lachenmann’s argument, the notion of ‘traditions’ refers to 
specific logics of action, linked to an ideal of solidarity, reciprocity and trust, 
which are embodied and frequently re-enacted during the important family 
ceremonies (like weddings, baptisms, and burials) as well as in the frame-
work of religious networks (Fall/Guèye 2002). Women who can rely on 
these informal social networks are more likely to be successful in linking up 
with formalised associative structures (Sarr 1998: 26), which are recognised 
by the state. Referring to an action research project on ‘Muslim women and 
development’, Doucouré also points to ‘the development potential of 
brotherhoods’ forms of association’.7 
However, according to the classical model of state promotion women’s 
groups must formalise and register before being able to participate in the 
programmes of the government or other development institutions. State 
institutions are reluctant to recognise traditional socio-cultural patterns and 
forms of organisation as an important potential for development. This atti-
tude is not only manifest in the official discourses and politics concerning 
economic development, but also in the domain of legal policies and 
women’s rights. Many NGOs share the viewpoint of the government, which 
holds that the major constraint for women to claim their rights is constituted 
by local cultural traditions. This argument is all the more popular as it 
avoids any direct confrontation with the religious powers and does not con-
tradict the position of those who see Islam as an emancipating force in fa-
vour of women’s rights.  
Among state officials and rights activists this position is very common – 
a typical example is Maïmouna Kane, founding member of the Association 
of Senegalese Jurists, former minister for social development, and one of the 
first female representatives in the Senegalese government. In an interview 
with a women’s NGO network she said:  
 
Muslim religion, in contrast to what people think, defends the rights of 
women. It has set up a revolution in relation to the situation women had 
before. Islam is not opposing itself against progress; in fact it urges us to-
wards science, towards progress (Réseau Siggil Jigeen 2005: 12).  
 
This statement goes along with a critical view on local culture, associated 
with ‘feudal structures’ and ‘traditional patriarchy’. It does not, however, 
give an explanation for the intermingling of power relations between the 
state and religious institutions. And it transmits a certain ambivalence con-
cerning the legitimacy of the secular constitution and Western oriented na-
                                            
7  Cf. Centre Africain de l'Entrepreneuriat Féminin (CAEF) 2001: 15. 
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tional legislation – is it actually supported by Islam or not? This question has 
become most acute in the debate concerning the national family law.  
 
 
The debate on the Family Code  
 
Senegal has ratified all the relevant international conventions for the elimi-
nation of discrimination against women and has also adopted laws penalis-
ing violence against women. Nevertheless in the national legislation some 
clauses still exist that contradict the Convention for the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), ratified without reser-
vation in 1985, as well as the principle of equal rights stipulated in the cur-
rent constitution voted upon in 2001 (Sow 2003: 75). The contradictions, 
which are constantly pointed out by women’s rights activists and NGOs, 
mainly concern the Senegalese Family Code. The latter has been hotly dis-
puted ever since it was presented to the public in 1972, constituting the ma-
jor bone of contention between the feminist movement and various Islamic 
forces.8 It has been called the ‘women’s code’ by its opponents, because it 
strengthened women’s legal position, determining conditions for marriage, 
inheritance and custody, which were formerly regulated by diverging legal 
practices, including customary, Quranic and French law (Creevey 1996: 297, 
Loimeier 1995: 197, Sow 1996: 150 ff.).  
The Family Code was intended to establish a unified law to be applied 
to all citizens, no matter their religious denomination. However, it contains 
some options for Muslims, to adopt a version of Islamic law corresponding 
to Quranic dispositions. This concerns for example inheritance (giving 
daughters one half of their brothers’ share) or marriage (dowry is accepted, 
polygamy possible). At the time of its enactment, Senegal was leading the 
way in terms of a Western-oriented ‘modernisation’, compared to other 
Muslim countries of the West African region (Sow 2003: 72), although it 
always encountered strong resistance from within. President Senghor, him-
self a Christian, used the Family Code to strengthen secularism and promote 
women’s emancipation as an integral part of his vision of an ‘African social-
ism’. With the official enactment of the code in 1973 Senghor overruled the 
objections of various elements of Senegalese society, notably the marabouts 
(Loimeier 1995: 197 f.). Until now, however, the code has been widely ig-
nored by the population.  
The state, in order to convince its citizens of the need to abandon local 
legal practices and accept the application of the national family law, used to 
refer to ‘international standards’, arguing that these were contradicted by 
                                            
8  See Schulz (2003) for the similar controversy over the family law in Mali.  
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the local ‘traditions’ (Villalón 1995: 98 f.). Recently, however, this discursive 
strategy has changed slightly. The government has come to rely strongly on 
women’s organisations and NGOs, who are promoting the code and sensi-
tising the population at the grassroots level. In this context, what is brought 
to the fore is less the idealised vision of secular modernity, but arguments 
that refer explicitly to religion, and in particular to Islam, in order to enhance 
the legitimacy of the national legislation. This changed attitude can be inter-
preted as a sign of awareness of an increased relevance of religious issues in 
national politics, where ‘everybody is manipulating religion’ (Fatou Sow in: 
Nageeb / Sieveking / Spiegel 2005: 17). It also indicates a situation in which 
the state is ‘trapped’ by its own symbolic representations and strategies. 
Cruise O’Brien has pointed out that ‘the state loses more by being ignored or 
avoided [by its Muslim population] than it does by confrontation’ (Cruise 
O'Brien 2003: 26). However, concerning the claims for a reform of the na-
tional family law, the new government refrains from confrontation and 
seems as reluctant as its predecessors to engage actively in a public debate 
because this would mean that the legitimacy of secular state power could be 
challenged not only by local religious authorities but also by women’s net-
works and civil society organisations.  
As indicated above, the debate concerning a reform of the national family 
law has been ongoing. Since the mid-eighties, when the UN women’s decade 
and the newly emerged Senegalese feminist movement strengthened the posi-
tion of women’s organisations, NGOs and trade unions have multiplied their 
efforts to promote the notions of women’s rights and gender equality in public 
discourse and advance their enactment in national legislation. The discussions 
heated up when in 2003 a new Islamic association, the Comité Islamique pour la 
Réforme du Code de la Famille du Sénégal (CIRCOFS), was founded, demanding a 
reform of the Family Code to adapt it more to Islamic law and principles of 
jurisprudence. Claiming to defend the Muslim identity of the majority of the 
population, the CIRCOFS called for a restoration of Muslim tribunals (abol-
ished by the Senghor regime) and a modification of several articles of the Code 
concerning marriage (conditions of its validity and obligations of husband and 
wife), divorce (legitimacy of repudiation), filiation and inheritance.  
While on the one hand the president of the republic publicly pro-
nounced himself against the project of CIRCOFS, on the other, he did not 
take measures to develop effective policies on the national or local level. 
Invoking global development discourses on women’s rights and gender 
equality on the level of national and international discourses, the govern-
ment left the task of popularising these concepts, and negotiating their 
meaning with the Muslim population at the local level to women’s organi-
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sations and networks, like the Réseau Siggil Jigeen (RSJ).9 Following this logic 
of action, in January 2005 the Ministry of Family published a policy paper 
entitled ‘National strategy for equity and gender equality in Senegal’.10 This 
paper was accompanied by two booklets containing an explicit ‘religious 
argumentation for gender equity’ – one formulated from a Muslim, the other 
from a Christian perspective. The two texts were intended to articulate a 
balanced religious perspective on the issue, that would not conflict with the 
government’s secular orientation.  
At the same time the RSJ, significantly involved in the development of the 
strategy paper, started a nationwide campaign for the modification of the Fam-
ily Code. In this context discussions with local women’s groups were organised 
all over the country, to provide basic knowledge about the Family Code and 
formulate arguments for its reform that would reflect the women’s own per-
spectives. The central thrust of the campaign concerned the notion of family 
authority, advocating a change from ‘paternal’ authority to ‘parental’ authority, 
acknowledging both father and mother as responsible for the children. An 
important strategy in the campaign was the use of religious arguments in fa-
vour of women’s rights, elaborated by ‘progressive’ Islamic scholars, such as 
the author of one of the above mentioned booklets, Abdul Aziz Kébé.11 Kébé  is 
Secretary General of an NGO called ‘Réseau Islam et Population’, an organisa-
tion founded at the instigation of the UN Population Fund and one of the few 
Islamic NGOs recognised by the state (Renders 2002: 73 f.). It supports the gov-
ernment in the areas of family planning and AIDS prevention, thereby repre-
senting positions (such as promoting the use of condoms) which are contested 
and even fiercely opposed by locally established religious authorities. The reli-
gious arguments elaborated by Kébé hence correspond to global development 
discourses, but to be effectively communicated and used for the purpose of 
women’s organisations on a broader societal level they need to be ‘translated’ 
and connected to popular discourses within local Muslim communities. What 
follows is an illustration of this process. 
 
 
                                            
9  In Wolof ‘siggil’ means ‘straighten, raise your head’; ‘jigeen’ means ‘woman’. 
10  Stratégie pour l’Égalité et l’Équité de Genre au Sénégal (République du Sénégal, Fonds 
des Nations Unies pour la Population (UNFPA/Sénégal) 2005. 
11  Cf. République du Sénégal, Ministére de la Famille du Développement Social et de la 
Solidarité Nationale, Fonds des Nations Unies pour la Population (UNFPA/Sénégal) 2005. 
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Women at the grassroots level negotiating their rights 
 
‘We don’t want equality; we want to be given our rights, because we are 
giving money ...’ – this statement was articulated by the NGO-activist Ndeye 
Diagne during a discussion with a local women’s group in Kaolack in March 
2005. Kaolack is the capital of a central region in the peanut basin, particu-
larly affected by poverty. In spite of its difficult economic, environmental 
and climatic living conditions, the city is known for its dynamism and some 
very vocal and combatant women’s organisations, among them the Asso-
ciation pour la Promotion de la Femme Sénégalaise (APROFES), an NGO which 
is member of the network RSJ. The above mentioned discussion was organ-
ised by APROFES and took place in a small courtyard in Medina, a popular 
quarter of Kaolack. Medina is located around the big mosque, which serves 
as the centre for the regionally dominant Sufi brotherhood (the Niasse 
branch of the Tijan order), presided by Imam Hassane Cissé, a sheikh who is 
known to be very active in supporting local development. He has founded 
his own NGO with strong bases in various metropoles of the United States 
and is well connected on a transnational level. At the same time he fre-
quently collaborates with APROFES and other local women’s organisations 
in Kaolack. 
Ndeye Diagne, a trained secretary with knowledge in French and Eng-
lish, is a permanent staff member of APROFES. She is in charge of issues 
related to women’s rights, HIV/AIDS-prevention and the NGO’s centre for 
female victims of domestic violence. She is also the local representative of 
‘Women in Law and Development in Africa’, a pan-African network for 
women’s rights. During the campaign for the reform of the family law she 
coordinated the discussions and supervised the NGO’s local agents, who 
had been trained as legal advisers. The latter work as intermediaries be-
tween the NGO and less formalised women’s groups from the local commu-
nities. The local agents and the members of the women’s groups share a 
similar social and economic background. They have little formal school and 
religious education (implying in this case, where all the women were Mus-
lim, a very restricted knowledge of the Quran). Most of them secure the 
livelihood for their families by maintaining various small-scale businesses in 
the agricultural and ‘informal’ economic sector. The majority of them live in 
polygamous households.  
To open the discussion with the women’s group in Medina, Diagne ex-
plained the aim and central concepts of the campaign. Her speech was pre-
sented in Wolof but some French terms had to be introduced, because they 
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were difficult to translate, like égalité de genre.12 She said that after mobilising 
the women, the men should get involved, because the issue concerned men 
and women equally. Then she underlined the importance of communicating 
with the religious authorities, to tell them that the campaign was not aimed 
at ‘making politics’, and that the women were in fact only asserting their 
‘rights’. Diagne described how a group of women activists from the RSJ had 
talked with the highest representatives of the Tijan and Murid brotherhoods 
to make their intentions clear. The experience of meeting them and being 
listened to had been empowering: ‘To talk with the marabouts directly – 
that’s a good thing!’  
With the above cited statement she summarised the arguments of the 
women’s delegation vis-à-vis the marabouts. Their claim – ‘we want to be 
given our rights, because we are giving money’ – referred to the fact that 
women have to pay more taxes than men, because the state attributes to the 
wife the legal status of a single, whereas the husband is considered as the 
‘head of the family’ in charge of his wife and the children. However, the 
statement could also be understood as a hint that women’s financial contri-
butions to their marabouts in the context of daaira activities are consider-
able.13 This suggestion could be well understood in the everyday context of 
the women present in the courtyard in Medina, where few people had a 
formal employment and paid taxes, but everybody was familiar with the 
economic impact of daaira-activities, which are proliferating in the local 
communities and neighbourhoods. 
In the course of the discussion, which was then opened to all the par-
ticipants and became very lively, many issues were raised that called for a 
modification of the actual family law: Women are giving birth, but cannot 
register their children themselves, women participate in the support of the 
household and care for the education and health of the children, and often as 
well of their husbands, without being able to assume this responsibility offi-
cially; they cannot apply for family allowances, nor for health insurance 
coverage for their children or their husbands, etc. ... The concept of ‘rights’ 
became the crystallising point for the arguments supporting the women’s 
claim for a change. The inequalities and injustices women have to face in 
their everyday life were exemplified by individual accounts of the difficul-
ties of their position in polygamous settings, their responsibility for securing 
                                            
12  Because ‘gender equality’ is difficult to translate into Wolof, the French term ‘genre’ 
was used, whereas ‘equality’ was mainly paraphrased with the Wolof term ‘yemmale’ 
(equilibrate/share/bring into balance). 
13  The negotiation power of women organised in religious associations is exercised ‘at the 
backstage’. It is based on the economic potential of their strong translocal and transnational 
networks and trading relations (cf. Salimata Thiam in: Nageeb / Sieveking / Spiegel 2005: 
13f., Salzbrunn 2004: 7). 
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livelihood for the whole family, facing male unemployment and out-migra-
tion, domestic violence and humiliations. Commenting on the examples 
given, the women concluded that their situation was ‘not normal’ (Wolof: 
diaduwul). In this assessment they were referring to a set of locally estab-
lished cultural norms and values, concerning women’s duties and obliga-
tions in the framework of hierarchical family structures and gender relations 
on the one side, and an ideal of social solidarity and a moral economy based 
on reciprocity on the other. 
As already indicated in Diagne’s statement, the term ‘equality’ – quite 
in contrast to the notion of ‘rights’ – was introduced with a disclaimer. Dur-
ing the discussion, one of the local agents, Aissatou Mbodj, put it like this: 
‘When we speak of equality it is not equality, in short, but the equality of 
rights, because God has created us different’. With this formulation, affirm-
ing the differences between men and women as something given by God, 
she asserted the women’s identity as Muslim believers, who do not question 
God’s creation. At the same time she contextualised the notion of equality by 
limiting its meaning to a discourse on rights and entitlements in the frame-
work of women’s position within the family. In a separate interview, where 
she explained her notion of equality in Wolof, Mbodj said:  
 
We don’t talk of being equal, but we talk of the rights of mother and father 
concerning the life with the children in the house. [...] It is the woman who 
is more tired but she is not given the rights that are accorded to the father – 
this is not normal! (Aissatou Mbodj, 10.02.06).  
 
From her perspective women’s rights should correspond to an acknowl-
edgement of their heavy workload, their huge responsibilities and the ful-
filment of their duties, which make them much more ‘tired’ than men. Yet, 
she accepts that women’s obligations and moral responsibilities are different 
from those of the men – this is why she prefers not to talk about equality.14 
Although the discussion had been opened with an explicit reference to 
the national Family Code, these rights were understood as something ac-
quired through women’s social and economic engagement in their daily life 
as wives and mothers, but not as an abstract principle or something given 
automatically to everybody in terms of citizenship by the national constitu-
tion or by the government signing an international convention. During the 
described event women’s rights were thus not discussed in terms of national 
or international legislation. While the relevant articles of the Family Code 
                                            
14  Ulrike Schultz (2005: 10 f.) analyses women’s economic practices and the strategies to 
make their income ‘invisible’, through maintaining gendered norms according to which the 
man is the provider of the family and refusing the principle of equality concerning the 
responsibility for the family income. 
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were mentioned and the numbers of the relevant paragraphs (§152 and §277) 
memorised, the concept of legal rights was hardly taken up in the discus-
sion. Rather the term ‘rights’ was related to customary law, to concrete social 
practices and a locally grounded logic of reciprocity, characterising the 
moral dimension of the everyday-life interactions of the participants.  
An important aspect in the context of the campaign was the women’s 
certainty, that the claim for a reform of the Family Code brought forward by 
the representatives of the NGO does not contradict the Quran. Ndeye Di-
agne’s report of the encounter with the marabouts contributed to this con-
viction. Furthermore, the women in Kaolack knew that they were not only 
supported by Islamic scholars in the academic sphere, but also by the influ-
ential religious leader of the locally dominant Sufi order, Imam Hassane 
Cissé. In an issue of the RSJ newsletter dedicated to the reform of the Family 
Code, Cissé was cited with the following statement:  
 
The whole society must join this movement which consists in reinstituting 
the working women’s rights. This is a disposition from which the whole 
society will profit. In Islam the woman has to have the same legal rights as 
men. The responsibility has to be executed by both parents to the benefit of 
the child and the woman has the right to aspire to a social coverage by the 
state (Réseau Siggil Jigeen 2005: 9, translation by the author). 
 
This statement comprises different aspects, that are important elements in the 
strategy of the campaign for the family law. Brought forward by a sheikh who 
is not only a locally respected religious authority but also a charismatic cosmo-
politan intellectual with an international fellowship, they represent a multiplic-
ity of voices and perspectives, that cannot be identified with the dualistic 
stereotypes of an either Islamic or Western oriented position. Cissé particularly 
points to working women and their rights (concerning family allowance, health 
insurance, etc.), linking the notion of legal rights to the issue of social security. 
Thereby he legitimises the claim for a reform of the Family Code not only by 
the Quran but also by essential elements of the national agenda of poverty 
reduction. Nevertheless he insists on the title of ‘head of the family’ for men, 
and argues for a compromise, which would maintain the traditionally estab-
lished principle of a single authority embodied by the husband. A similar posi-
tion is assumed by the above cited former minister of social development, 
Maïmouna Kane. Concerning the articles of the Family Code which define the 
status of the man as head of the household, she states:  
 
This doesn’t bother me. It would be unjust to say that the woman must be 
head of the family. In life one has to make ‘concessions’. It’s like going in an 
office, where one finds a boss who is embodying the authority, but this 
doesn’t mean that the others are harmed or ‘damaged’ in their rights (Réseau 
Siggil Jigeen 2005: 11-14, translation by the author).  
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The code has indeed always been a compromise. When it was established, sev-
eral articles concerning, for example, the age of marriage and the prohibition of 
forced marriages, were quite revolutionary (Sow 2003: 72). Kane explains the 
historical signification of the Family Code as a tool for the implementation of 
the state’s policy of ‘women’s advancement’, which she posits, could respond 
to the needs of social and economic change while still preserving one’s own 
cultural identity: ‘I think we have our own values and that the women should 
not try to copy the Western model’ (Réseau Siggil Jigeen 2005: 14, translation by 
the author). And she highlights the ability to make compromises while negoti-
ating women’s rights corresponding to a shared moral code concerning the 
well being of children, of the family, and of the society as a whole as an integral 
part of Senegalese cultural identity.  
It is interesting to compare this position with the attitude of Mouslymatou 
Ndiaye, coordinator of the National Federation of Groups for Women’s Ad-
vancement, an organisation closely linked to the state administration, in charge 
of regrouping all the officially registered ‘groups for women’s advancement’ on 
a national level. Ndiaye saw the reason for the difficult living conditions of 
women in the ‘backwardness’ of local culture, especially in remote rural areas. 
She emphasised that women’s submission was not due to religion: ‘Religion is 
not very restrictive – it is Senegalese culture which has established women’s 
oppression’ (Interview Mouslymatou Ndiaye, 14.04.04). Moreover she believed 
that once the cultural ties were broken (le lien culturel cassé), Senegalese women 
could acquire an ‘equal status’ as enjoyed by men. In contrast to Maïmouna 
Kane, as well as the NGO activists and the local women’s group in Kaolack, 
Ndiaye conceived of local cultural traditions as a form of bondage, as a hin-
drance to women’s liberation, and as an unlikely resource in negotiating 
women’s rights.  
 
 
Conclusion: contextualising development concepts 
 
Women’s diverse strategies in negotiating their rights and their partial rejec-
tion of the concept of equality reflect the processes of social differentiation, 
reproduced at the interface of different social agencies and development 
institutions. In contrast to the notion of equality, the concept of rights seems 
much more appropriate to deal with the prevailing social distinctions and 
hierarchies, characterising not only the gendered relations within the family, 
but also the communication between local, national and global development 
agencies, as well as between representatives of diverse Muslim organisations 
and institutions. The distinctive appropriation and use of the two concepts 
are related to complex and sometimes contradictory identity politics within 
contemporary Senegalese society. The discursive construct of an ‘equality of 
rights’ illustrates the dynamics of glocalisation. Its meaning has to be under-
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stood in terms of a constant re-contextualisation, in which the boundaries of 
established social structures and moral communities are redefined.  
The new ‘National strategy for equity and gender equality in Senegal’, 
promulgated by the government, is partially contradicted by the arguments 
brought forward by the women’s group in Kaolack. They interpret the 
global concepts of gender equality and women’s rights according to local 
norms of solidarity and reciprocity, translating them into the notion of an 
‘equality of rights’. This concept does not necessarily imply gender equality, 
but rather articulates a notion of women’s rights based on the recognition of 
social inequalities. These inequalities constitute the main references for 
women’s negotiation strategies, shaping the everyday practices and forms of 
organisation, in which women build agency and networks for their social 
and economic activities. However, these female spaces are largely excluded 
from state promoted development projects and are marginalised by national 
and international development agencies, who tend to interpret them as 
manifestations of ‘backward’ cultural traditions, that have to be transformed 
and modernised. 
Concerning the position of women’s organisations and their visions of 
development, different perspectives have to be considered. State-promoted 
structures, globally connected NGOs, and locally grounded networks or asso-
ciations occupy different social spaces and bring forward divergent ideas of 
development. To understand their interrelatedness an analysis of the position 
of the different actors involved in the debate on a reform of the family law is 
very instructive. In the collaboration of the state with women’s organisations 
like the RSJ or APROFES a kind of division of labour can be observed. While 
the government officially promotes gender equality to assume its ‘progressive’ 
position in the eyes of the international community, it refrains from adopting 
any concrete policies that could lead to a direct confrontation with local Muslim 
authorities. This field is left for the NGOs, who join in the strategy; thereby 
assisting the government in its efforts to avoid a politicisation of religion, such 
as intended by the CIRCOFS and other Islamic organisations who oppose the 
secular character of the national constitution and legislation.  
Religion, as part of local cultural realities, but also as an element of 
global cultural flows, plays a decisive role in the processes of negotiating 
development in Senegal. Yet, the described case shows that women are not 
only acting according to prescribed religious rules and norms, but also use 
religion instrumentally. Depending on the context and the women’s own 
social and economic background, they might use a progressive Islam inter-
pretation such as the ‘religious argumentation for gender equity’ or prefer to 
rely on alliances with traditional Sufi authorities, who know that their fe-
male disciples can easily withdraw their social and economic support if their 
needs and expectations are ignored. Analysing women’s diverse negotiation 
strategies and the way they relate global and local discourses thus allows the 
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questioning of the current label of women’s vulnerability, almost stereotypi-
cally applied to Muslim societies in public discourses on a global level. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Der Artikel analysiert, wie Frauenorganisationen im Senegal sich globale Ent-
wicklungskonzepte aneignen und deren Bedeutung unter Bezug auf lokale Dis-
kurse und Praktiken aushandeln. Er basiert auf einer Fallstudie zu einer NRO-
Kampagne zur Reform des nationalen Familienrechts, die auf Frauenrechte und 
Geschlechtergleichheit fokussiert. Das spannungsgeladene Verhältnis zwischen 
westlich dominierten Entwicklungsdiskursen und der offiziellen Frauenförder-
politik des säkularen Staates einerseits und den Normen der lokalen muslimi-
schen Gesellschaft andererseits spiegelt die komplexe Dynamik von Glokalisie-
rungsprozessen. Indem die Autorin die Handlungsstrategien von Frauenorgani-
sationen auf lokaler Ebene und den Aspekt der Handlungsmacht hervorhebt, 
stellt sie das verbreitete Stereotyp der ‘verletzlichen’ unterdrückten Frau in der 
muslimischen Gesellschaft in Frage. 
 
Schlüsselwörter 
 
Senegal, Entwicklung, Gender, Frauenrechte, Familienrecht, Islam 
 
 
Résumé 
 
L’article montre comment des organisations de femmes au Sénégal s’approprient 
des notions globales de développement et négocient leur signification par rap-
port aux pratiques et discours au niveau local. Le matériel empirique provient 
d’une étude de cas de la campagne nationale d’une ONG pour une réforme du 
code de la famille qui met l’accent sur les notions des droits de la femme et 
l’égalité de genre. La tension entre les discours sur le développement dominés 
par les organisations multilatérales et institutions de développement occidenta-
les et la politique de promotion de la femme menée par l’Etat laïque d’un côté, et 
les normes de la société musulmane locale de l’autre, reflète les dynamiques 
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complexes de la glocalisation. En mettant l’accent sur les stratégies mises en oeu-
vre par les organisations de femmes au niveau local, leur pouvoir de négociation 
et leur potentiel d’action, cet article remet en question le stéréotype répandu de 
la ‘vulnérabilité’ de la femme dans la société musulmane. 
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